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impeachment and removal from office upon conviction? Under
the Constitution, "[t] he President, Vice President and all civil offi-
cers of the United States, shall be removed from office on im-
peachment for, and conviction of treason, bribery, or other high
crimes and misdemeanors."'
The nature of the offenses that are impeachable is a continu-
2
ing source of controversy among commentators. Constitutional
scholar Michael Gerhardt does not think very highly of most of the
3literature on the impeachment process. Bob Barr, a member of
the U.S. House of Representatives (Georgia), believes any violation
of public trust is an impeachable offense.4 Typically impeachment
defendants assert that they are entitled to due process or other
rights traditionally protected in the criminal process. One reason
impeachment defendants argue for certain procedural rights
guaranteed under the Constitution is because no court has
decided, with authority, the degree to which the Bill of Criminal
Procedural Guarantees applies to impeachment.6 The debate
surrounding whether the proper process for an impeachment
proceeding is criminal procedure is not new. Lawyers, politicians,
commentators and others have debated the criminal nature of the
8impeachment process without resolving the question.
The impeachment process debate has historically concen-
trated on whether an impeachable offense is limited to any crime,
or if it includes non-criminal offenses and fiduciary breaches as
well.9 William Blackstone's highly respected eighteenth century
1. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
2. Michael J. Gerhardt, The Constitutional Limits to Impeachment and its Alterna-
tives, 68 TEx. L. REv. 1, 5 (1989).
3. Id. at 4-5. "Given all the attention and importance attached to the im-
peachment process from the inception of our Republic to the present, it is surpris-
ing that the literature on impeachment-split primarily between the formalist
and informalist approaches-is, with few exceptions,
unenlightening and unimpressive." Id.
4. Bob Barr, High Crimes and Misdemeanors: The Clinton-Gore Scandals and the
Question of Impeachment, 2 TEx. REv. L. & POL. 1, 4-5 (1997).
5. Buckner F. Melton, Jr., Federal Impeachment And Criminal Procedure: The
Framers' Intent, 52 MD. L. REv. 437, 438 (1993). E.g., Nixon v. United States, 506
U.S. 224, 234 (1993); Hastings v. United States Senate, 887 F.2d 332, Nos. 89-5188,
81-5191, 1989 WL 122685 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (unpublished disposition).
6. Melton, supra note 5, at 438.
7. Id. at 438-39.
8. Id. at 439.
9. Id.
[Vol. 27:42500
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commentaries, which were contemporaneous with the Constitu-
tional Convention, take the position that a peer may be impeached
for any crime.'0 Raoul Berger has taken an expansive view of the
basis for an impeachable offense." Berger has generally been iden-
tified with the position that impeachable offenses are not limited to
indictable criminal offenses. 12 Other commentators do not agree
with Berger's impeachable offense rationale." Unlike Berger,
Theodore Dwight believes that an impeachable offense must not
only be a crime but a specific type of crime. 14 According to Dwight,
any impeachable crime not specifically named in the United States
Constitution can only be cause for impeachment if committed
against the statutory laws of the United States. 15 Dwight believes
impeachable offenses are limited to federal crimes.16 Blackstone
thinks any crime is an adequate basis for an impeachment proceed-
ing.17 In 1974, the House Judiciary Committee came to the conclu-
sion that an impeachable offense is not limited to crimes. Profes-
sor Ronald D. Rotunda, a constitutional law scholar, believes that
just because the Constitution says impeachment includes treason,
bribery and other high crimes and misdemeanors does not limit
impeachment to criminal offenses.' 9 According to Congressman
Barr, criminality has never been treated as a necessary element of
20the impeachment process.
Once again it is both necessary and proper for discussing the
constitutional implications of Presidential impeachment because
the Monica Lewinsky scandal has made impeachment a hot consti-
10. Id. at 457 n.12 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 258-61
(1783)).
11. Id. at 457 n.12 (citing RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTrrUTIONAL
PROBLEMS 7-52 (1973)).
12. Id.
13. Id.at439n.13.
14. Id. at 457 n.12 (citing Theodore W. Dwight, Trial by Impeachment, 15 AM.
L. REG. 257, 269 (1867)).
15. Id.at457n.13
16. Id.
17. Id. (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 259-60).
18. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., CONSTITUTIONAL
GROUNDS FOR PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT 22-25 (Comm. Print 1974)
("[I] mpeachable conduct need not be criminal.").
19. Ronald D. Rotunda, Symposium, On Judicial Discipline and Impeachment: An
Essay on the Constitutional Parameters of Federal Impeachment, 76 KY. LJ. 707, 721-28
(1987-88).
20. Barr, supra note 4, at 14.
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S 21
tutional and political item.
On October 8, 1998, the United States House of Representa-
tives started formal debate on House Resolution 581, authorizing
the Committee on the Judiciary to "[i] nvestigate whether sufficient
grounds exist for the impeachment of William Jefferson Clinton,
President of the United States. ''22 A number of years ago, Professor
Rotunda once said that it is an appropriate time "for discussing the
federal law of impeachment because impeachment is not currently
a part of our daily news diet."
2
Because the impeachment issue was recently a part of the daily
news media and national conscience, we must engage in proper
constitutional scrutiny to decide the issue on the basis of constitu-
24tional principle rather than result-oriented thinking.
In impeachment proceedings against Supreme Court Justice
William 0. Douglas, then House Minority Leader Representative
Gerald Ford concluded that an impeachable offense under the
Constitution, "is whatever a majority of the House of Representa-
tives considers it to be at a given moment in history. 2 ' Representa-
tive Ford's comments, indicating a broad scope of judicial im-
peachment, have been subjected to criticism.26 At the end of the
21. Daniel Casse, How the GOP Can Distinguish Itself, WALL ST.J., Nov. 4, 1998,
at A22.
Impeachment proceedings are obviously the most immediate item on the
GOP agenda. ByJanuary, we will likely have a yea or nay vote on whether
to remove the president from office .... Contempt for Mr. Clinton's be-
havior, by itself, did not provide sufficient fuel to power the '98 cam-
paign. It will not be enough to carry the party through 2000. But shap-
ing the agenda at a time when it is hard to tell Democratic television ads
from Republican ones is a challenge .... Even the Monica Lewinsky scan-
dal may have, paradoxically, dulled the Republican edge on moral lead-
ership, long a GOP advantage. While Mr. Clinton has thus far shown that
it is possible to behave immorally and lie under oath yet still keep your
job, that is not a lesson Democrats will likely take to heart. After Monica,
Democrats will no longer be able to argue, as so many once did, that
character doesn't matter, and will thus join sides with the Republicans on
this issue as well.
Id.
22. 144 CONG. REc. H1005-02 (1998).
23. Rotunda, supra note 19, at 707.
24. Id. "The time is particularly appropriate for discussing the federal law of
impeachment because impeachment is not currently a part of our daily news diet
*- We can thus discuss this issue calmly, without the pressures, either conscious or
subconscious, of result-oriented thinking." Id.
25. 116 CONG. REc. 11,912 (1970) (statement of Rep. Gerald Ford).
26. Barr, supra note 4, at 10. See also BERGER, supra note 11, at 53-54.
2502 [Vol. 27:4
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impeachment day, an impeachable offense is defined by the politi-
cal realities of an appropriate majority of the members of Congress
and all the Constitution requires is that the important decision be
justified as a serious political offense. The Constitution allows the
President to be at risk of impeachment for any political, criminal or
civil offense serious enough to offend the political compass of an
adequate majority in the United States House of Representatives.
If the President offends the political compass of America enough
for Congress to start impeachment proceedings, the following steps
will be taken. First, the impeachment proceeding will start in the
House of Representatives, because only the House can bring
21charges against the President for an alleged offense. Second, if a
simple majority of the House votes to approve the charges against
the President, the Senate has the singular responsibility to grant
the President a trial on the charges.2s After the Senate receives the
articles of impeachment from the House, the articles are served on
the President in the form of a subpoena. 29 A presidential im-
peachment trial is presided over by the Chief Justice of the United
States Supreme Court.3 ° During the impeachment trial, the Presi-
dent may attend with legal counsel in order to present witnesses
and evidence in support of his challenge to the impeachment31
charges. It is the job of the House Managers to present the spe-
32
cific charges against the President at the trial. At the trial, a sepa-
rate vote is taken on each of the specific charges in order to allow
the President's lawyers to take attention away from any pattern of•33 •34
impeachable conduct. If two-thirds of the Senate who are pre-• 35
sent vote to convict the President on each article of impeachment,
he will be removed from office.
Part I of this article provides a brief introduction to the im-
peachable offense controversy.36 Part II discusses the historical de-
27. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5.
28. Id. § 3, cl. 6.
29. S. Rep. No. 99-33, at 3 (1986).
30. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
31. S. REP. No. 99-33, at 69-72 (1986).
32. Richard M. Pious, The Presidency: Twenty-Five Years After Watergate: Impeach-
ing the President: The Intersection of Constitutional and Popular Law, 43 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 859, 864 (1999).
33. Id.
34. In a Senate of 100, the majority of Senate votes are needed for conviction.
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
36. Supra Part I.
2001] 2503
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velopment of the high crime and misdemeanor concept as political
ammunition. 7 Part III articulates the analysis that Congress' broad
constitutional power to impeach the President is limited by its po-
litical self-interest compass. Part IV examines Clinton's impeach-
ment legacy as an expansive interpretation of impeachable offenses
under the other high crimes and misdemeanors language of the
39Constitution. Part V discusses the congressional political compass
self-interest directive. 4° Finally, the article draws the conclusion
that the Senate read the political compass tea leaves and resolved
that the President's inappropriate sexual behavior did not merit
conviction and removal from office.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF HIGH CRIMES AND
MISDEMEANORS As POLITICAL AMMUNITION
It is generally believed that the authors of the United States
Constitution followed the British procedure for impeachment with
significant modifications.' 1 The American modifications to the
British impeachment process were designed to avoid or retard the
common practice in England of using the impeachment process as
a weapon of political warfare.42 Some believe the radical Republi-
can majority in the House of Representatives ignored the intent of
the founding fathers and impeached President Andrew Johnson for
political motives in 1868.43 During President Johnson's impeach-
ment trial, Senator Charles Sumner said, "this proceeding is politi-
cal in character with a political object."44 Others contend that the
Johnson impeachment trial vote in the United States Senate estab-
lished beyond question under the Constitution that impeachment
is judicial in nature rather than political.4 5 President Johnson's ac-
quittal of impeachable offenses represents radical Republicans fail-
ing by one vote to remove a President from office for political rea-
sons under a constitutionally permissible process. Once the House
37. Infra Part 1I.
38. Infta Part III.
39. Infra Part IV.
40. Infra Part V.
41. Gerhardt, sup-a note 2, at 82; Milton Lomask, The American Presidency, at
http://www.gi.grolier.com/presidents/ea/side/impeach.html.
42. Lomask, supra note 41.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
2504 [Vol. 27:4
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impeaches the President, the Senate is required to place the Presi-
dent on trial for the impeachable offense with a two-thirds majorityS 46
vote necessary for conviction. For all practical purposes, the con-
stitutional definition of an impeachable offense is to be decided by• 47
the United States Congress. In defining an impeachable offense,
the Congress may not use its power in an arbitrary manner.4 At
the very start of this country's history, impeachment was identified
with moments of political crisis and partisan political rivalry.49
The only historical barrier to have really applied to the im-
peachable offense concept is the political climate at any time in his-
tory. 50 History reveals that impeachment may be motivated by poli-
tics and, as a matter of practical reality, is usually resolved by
politics. 51 There are no impartial analyses by the Congress of im-
peachable offenses free of political motives. There have been many
attempts to limit the influence of politics in defining the bounds of
an impeachable offense.
III. CONGRESS' BROAD CONSTITUTIONAL POWER To IMPEACH THE
PRESIDENT Is LIMITED BY ITS POLITICAL COMPASS OF SELF-INTEREST
Former President Gerald Ford, while serving in Congress in
1970, raised the critical question of what constitutes an impeach-
53
able offense in contemporary America. In answer to his own
question, Congressman Ford suggested that either a federal judge
or a President may be convicted of any impeachable offense that
two-thirds of the Senate considers serious enough to compel re-
moval of the guilty party from office. 4 Ford's statement about
Congress' broad-based political power basis for an impeachable of-
fense expresses the reality of impeachment far more closely than
his critics do.55
It is believed that Ford's desire for the impeachment of Justice
46. U.S. CONST. art. I § 3, cl. 6.
47. Rotunda, supra note 19, at 727.
48. Id.
49. PETER C. HOFFER & N.E.H. HuLL, IMPEACHMENT IN AMERICA 1803-05
(1984).
50. Gerhardt, supra note 2, at 82.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 82-3.
53. 116 CONG. REC. 11,913 (1970) (statement of Rep. Gerald Ford).
54. Id.
55. Id.; see also Gerhardt, supra note 2, at 82.
2001] 2505
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Douglas was inspired by political retaliation because the Senate
failed to confirm two of President Nixon's nominees to the United
56States Supreme Court. Our founding fathers at the Constitutional
Convention understood impeachment as a political proceeding
with the accused being charged with a political crime. 7 It was a
consensus at the Constitutional Convention that the President
could only be impeached and removed for political crimes, which
constituted great offenses.
A. Presidential Impeachable Offenses Cause Injury To The Nation's
Political Compass
An impeachable offense is any offense that causes great injury
to the nation's political compass as determined by an appropriate
majority of Congress.59 One scholar has described constitutional
law "as a process by which each generation gives formal expression
to the values it holds fundamental in the operations of govern-
ment." An impeachable offense may properly be described as any
harm to the political compass of the community by which each
generation gives expression to the values it holds fundamental in
61the President of the United States.
Only weeks before the 1998 congressional elections, the Re-
publican Party impeachment political compass indicated that it
would be politically popular to impeach President Bill Clinton be-. 62
cause of the Lewiisky scandal. Disappointed by their election set-
56. Melissa H. Maxman, In Defense of the Constitution's Judicial Impeachment
Standard, 86 MICH. L. REv. 420, 444 n.135 (1987).
57. Gerhardt, supra note 2, at 84.
58. Id. at 84.
59. BERGER, supra note 11, at 88. James Iredell, who would later serve on the
Supreme Court, stated during the constitutional ratification process that im-
peachment could occur from any great injury to the community. Id. (citation
omitted).
60. Terrance Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 79 Micii. L. REv. 1033,
1068 (1981).
61. Id. at 1069.
62. Bennett Roth, Election Aftermath/The Nation/GOP Says it Missed its Wave by
Keeping Focus on Scandal, Hous. CHRON., Nov. 5, 1998, at IA, available at 1998 WL
16780519. Roth stated:
In the aftermath of unexpected midterm election losses, Republicans on
Wednesday conceded that they had offered voters a muddled message
and failed to do as good ajob as the Democrats in turning out their core
supporters .... Furthermore, it became clear that the scandal involving
President Clinton, which the GOP once hoped to ride to greater victo-
2506 [Vol. 27:4
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setback, House Republicans initially indicated they would scale
down their impeachment investigation of President Clinton and
announced plans to publicly question only one witness, independ-
ent counsel Kenneth Starr.63 House Judiciary Committee Chair-
man, Henry Hyde, Republican (IL), panel investigated whether
President Clinton illeally tried to hide his affair with Lewinsky,jus-
tifying impeachment. Hyde talked with Republican members of
his panel and announced the downsized investigation. 65 Hyde's
remarks were made two days after his party lost five house seats in
the midterm election, giving the Republicans a smaller majority.66
Republicans, who ran ads asking voters not to reward Clinton's
behavior by electing Democrats, had earlier forecast a double-digit
gain. Hyde denied the voting played a role in the decision to speed
up his hearings and cited opinion polls showing impeachment
ranked low among voter concerns. Those same surveys, however,
found six of every ten voters saying they wanted the impeachment
inquiry dropped. In Houston, Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison, Re-
publican (TX), said the election might make impeachment less
certain. "I think that the House was certainly going toward articles
of impeachment, and Ijust don't know if that has changed.,
6
1
B. A Partisan Political Compass To Impeach A President Is Fatal To An
Impeachment Proceeding
The majority of voters clearly indicated in the electoral process
that they wanted the impeachment charges against Clinton
dropped, but congressional Republicans did not understand the
ries, did not work in their favor, with exit polls showing that most voters
did not believe that the President's behavior was relevant to their election
selections .... IJohn] Linder [R-Ga,] acknowledged that Republicans
failed to articulate compelling issues in a year when Clinton's affair with
Monica Lewinsky dominated media attention .... 'The Clinton scandals
became a filter through which we could not penetrate with a clear mes-
sage about what the Republican majority has achieved in a remarkably
short time,' ... said [Jim Nicholson, chairman of the Republican National
Committee].
Id.
63. John C. Henry, Only Witness Panel Will Call: Kenneth Star/Republicans Move
to Cut Time Spent on Impeachment Probe, Hous. CHRON., Nov. 6, 1998, at IA.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 16A.
2001] 2507
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political winds of the no-impeachment voters and pondered what
would happen next." One significant pattern in an impeachment
proceeding is the congressional pressure to find a non-partisan ba-
sis for the impeachment decision.
On December 19, 1998, the House of Representatives passed
two articles of impeachment against President Clinton. 70 The first
article of impeachment alleged that President Clinton committed
perjury in his August 17, 1998, grand jury testimony, and the sec-
ond alleged that he obstructed justice. The impeachment vote
was primarily a partisan vote along party lines with a small number
of defectors.
Commentators immediately characterized the impeachment
vote against Clinton as partisan politics. 73 Republicans supporting
the impeachment vote were described as out of touch with the
world outside the beltway and the standards of fair play that still ex-
ist in America.74 Republicans claimed they were voting for im-
peachment based on evidence in the Judiciary Committee Report.
At least forty Republicans were accused of considering evidence
not contained in the Judiciary Report because they visited a con-
gressional office to look at materials containing unsubstantiated al-
legations discovered by Kenneth Starr about Clinton's relations
with women other than Lewinsky. With the House impeachment
vote, Clinton made history by becoming the second President to
ever be impeached." During the Clinton impeachment, "vote
margins were razor thin and sharply partisan."8 Only five Democ-
rats joined the House Republicans in passing the two articles of
68. Id.
69. Michael J. Gerhardt, The Presidency: Twenty-Five Years After Watergate Putting
the Law of Impeachment in Perspective, 43 ST. Louis U. L.J. 905, 928 (1999).
70. Special Report: The Vote to Impeach, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 28, 1998/Jan. 4, 1999, at
30.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Howard Fineman & Debra Rosenberg, Special Report: Washington at War,
NEWSWEEK, Dec. 28, 1998/Jan. 4, 1999, at 34, 36.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 34. Clinton was impeached one year after Monica Lewinsky re-
ceived a subpoena to testify in the Paula Jones case. Id. It is believed that the
PaulaJones subpoena was the event leading to Clinton's impeachment. Id.
78. Id.
2508 [Vol. 27:4
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impeachment. 79 At the start of the Clinton impeachment debate,
Democratic House leader Dick Gephardt said, "[t]he politics of
smear and slash-and-burn must end." 0 Gephardt's comments re-
ceived a bipartisan standing ovation.8 ' However, immediately after
the ovation, the partisan impeachment politics of smear and slash-
and-burn resumed.82
From a historical perspective, Alexander Hamilton recognized
that the impeachment process could begin as a partisan event but
that an impeachment vote should never be taken on a partisan po-
litical basis. Hamilton advised that by the conclusion of the im-
peachment process, members of Congress should reach a nonparti-
san decision about the nature and goal of the impeachment
84hearings. An impeachment proceeding is considered nonpartisan
when a decision is reached which has the support of "all right
thinking men." 5
The Clinton impeachment proceedings are likely to be viewed
very harshly by history because of its highly partisan nature from
start to finish. The day after the Clinton impeachment acquittal,
there was an immediate rush to judgment condemning the im-
peachment proceedings as a partisan, political failure. "It may have
been a case doomed from the beginning, tainted as it was by parti-
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Gerhardt, supra note 69, at 928. See THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 365 (Alex-
ander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
84. Gerhardt, supra note 69, at 929.
85. Id.; 144 CONG. REc. HIl, 968-03, H12, 011 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1998).
86. Gerhardt, supra note 69, at 929-30.
In other words, congressional practices reflect the judgment that the
Constitution envisions that impeachment should not be used to punish
or retaliate against impeachable officials, such as the President and fed-
eral judges, because of their opinions, policy differences, or innocent er-
rors ofjudgment. Nor should impeachment be used for largely partisan
purposes; hence, some senators refused to convict Associate Justice Sam-
uel Chase or President Andrew Johnson for fear that if either were re-
moved, future presidents or judges from their party would likely be pun-
ished in the impeachment process just by virtue of their party affiliation.
Rather, impeachment generally should be deployed against impeachable
officials for having engaged in some misconduct that (1) has caused
some serious injury to the republic or to the constitutional system and
(2) has a nexus with the official's formal duties.
2001] 2509
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sanship, prejudgment, politics and an overwhelming lack of public
support for conviction."87 On Friday, February 12, 1999, the United
States Senate acquitted President Clinton of perjury and obstruc-
tion ofjustice charges, ending an orchestrated Republican effort to
drive him from office. 8 The Senate's rejection of both articles of
impeachment was a severe disapproval of the Republican effort to
oust the President.8" The abandoned articles of impeachment were
a direct result of the President's affair with former White House in-
tern, Monica Lewinsky, and his alleged effort to cover up the rela-
tionship. 9° Clinton's impeachment acquittal was an extremely par-
tisan vote along political lines. On the perjury charge, not a single
Democratic Senator out of forty-five Democrats voted to convict the
President while only ten Republican Senators voted the President
not guilty.9' However, forty-five Republicans voted the President
guilty on the perjury charge."' On the obstruction of justice
charge, forty-five Democrats and five Republicans found the Presi-
dent not guilty.93 In comparison, fifty Republicans voted to convict
the President in the obstruction ofjustice article of impeachment.94
On the obstruction of justice charge, the Republicans voted in a
87. Tony Freemantle & John C. Henry, House Prosecutors' Case Seemed "Doomed
From the Beginning" Hous. CHRON., Feb. 13, 1999, at 19A.
It may have been that the case alleging that President Clinton lied under
oath and obstructed justice was a difficult one to prosecute, even absent
the politics. It may have been, as was suggested by opposing counsel, that
the thirteen House Republicans who acted as the President's prosecutors
simply wanted to win badly. Or, according to a sampling of prominent
defense lawyers, legal scholars and politicians, it may have been that the
House prosecutors lost their case against the President Friday because of
all of the above.
Id.
88. John C. Henry, Clinton Acquitted: Votes Fail as History Plays Out in Senate,
Hous. CHRON., Feb. 13, 1999, at IA.
89. Id.
90. Id.
It also signaled that U.S. presidents are not easily deposed. In the only
previous impeachment trial of a president 131 years ago, Andrew John-
son was acquitted by one vote. While neither charge against Clinton
mustered a simple 51-vote majority, much less the two-thirds needed for
the Senate to convict him, the President is forever paired with Johnson as
the nation's only impeached presidents.
Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
2510 [Vol. 27:4
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ten-to-one margin to convict the President in a highly charged, par-
tisan atmosphere.9 5
The day after the Clinton impeachment vote, House Judiciary
Committee Chairman Henry Hyde, an Illinois Republican who
served as Chief House Prosecutor during Clinton's Senate trial, said
that he had no regrets about the verdict because "Congress had ful-
filled [its] oath of office to discharge [its] duty according to the
Constitution. ''96 Alexander Hamilton would probably disagree with
Hyde's suggestion that the House members voting to impeach the
President performed their duty well because history ultimately re-
quires a non-partisan basis for impeaching President Clinton. 97
The impeachment proceedings became so politically partisan that
some commentators stated the day after the Clinton acquittal that
the outcome of the impeachment trial was never in doubt, even be-
fore the House passed the articles of impeachment. 98
C. Articles Of Impeachment Against A President May Be Checked By The
Popular Political Compass Against Impeachment
The recent unsuccessful attempt to remove President Clinton
from office through the impeachment process teaches us that any
congressional allegations of serious breaches of the public trust are
be guided by popular sentiment against impeaching a president.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 18A.
97. Gerhardt, supra note 69, at 928.
Yet another significant pattern in impeachment proceedings is that as the
latter unfold members of Congress increasingly feel the pressure to find
some non-partisan basis for their decisions that will withstand the test of
time. This pressure comes from the increasing awareness that the legiti-
macy of their decisionmaking will depend largely on the judgment of his-
tory. In Federalist Number Sixty-Five, Alexander Hamilton warned that
impeachments would often begin in a partisan atmosphere. Conse-
quently, Hamilton counseled, the further along an impeachment pro-
ceeded the more members of Congress needed to find a non-partisan ba-
sis on which to resolve the proceedings.
Id.
98. Henry, supra note 88, at 18A.
Well before the House passed the articles of impeachment in mid-
December, the outcome of the trial was never in doubt. Clinton had
enough allies among the Senate Democrats to secure the thirty-four votes
needed to block conviction and removal. His acquittal was assured Jan.
27 when forty-four Democrats voted to dismiss the charges and end the
trial.
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Less than a week before the Senate voted that President Clinton
was not guilty of committing any impeachable offenses, commenta-
tors reported that America is "deeply tired ... of the Lewinsky affair
and the resulting impeachment mess." By deciding to support
President Clinton in his battle against impeachment, the public was
really supporting political proportionality in the electoral Democ-
ratic process. The public saw the zealous efforts by Republican
House prosecutors to convict the President of an impeachable of-
fense as an effort to reverse the results of a presidential election to
be more problematic than the President's conduct.' The Repub-
lican cure of impeaching Clinton was more politically offensive to
the voting public than was Clinton's political disease in the Lewin-
sky affair.'02 Professor Pollitt stated, prior to the impeachment vote,
that an impeachment would not be successful if the House mem-
bers simply responded to public sentiment.10 3 Days before the Sen-
ate vote of not guilty on the impeachment charges, a Newsweek poll
indicated only twenty-eight percent of Americans thought Presi-
dent Clinton should be removed from office. °4 The Newsweek poll
also revealed fifty-four percent of Americans believed that the Re-
publican Party was hurt by the manner in which the impeachment
proceeding was handled on Capitol Hill.10 5 A mere nine percent of
Americans believed the Republicans were helped by the impeach-
ment proceeding in the poll.
0 6
A few days before the Senate vote in the impeachment pro-
99. Jonathan Alter, National Affairs, The Fallout, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 8, 1999, at 28.
100. Id. at 30.
101. Id. at28.
102. Id. at 30. President Clinton was deposed in the PaulaJones case on Janu-
ary 17, 1998, during which he denied an affair with former White House intern,
Monica Lewinsky. Id. The President repeated this denial to a nationwide audi-
ence on January 21 and again on January 27. Id. Six months later the President
told a nationwide audience, and then a grand jury, 'I did have a relationship with
Ms. Lewinsky that was not appropriate. In fact, it was wrong.' Id. Following
months of investigation, on September 9, independent counsel Kenneth Starr sent
a report to Congress alleging information that could constitute grounds for im-
peachment: perjury, subornation of perjury, and obstruction of justice arising
from Clinton's actions in trying to conceal his relationship with the former intern.
Id. See also Daniel Pollitt, Sex In The Oval Office and Cover-Up Under Oath: Impeachable
Offense?, 77 N.C. L. REv. 259, 259-60 (1998).
103. Alter, supra note 99, at 30.
104. Evan Thomas & Mark Hosenball, National Affairs, The Endgame (Bill Clinton
Impeachment Trial Nears the End), NEWsWEEK, Feb. 8, 1999, at 22, 24.
105. Id. at 26.
106. Id.
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ceeding, it finally became clear, even to the Republicans, that the
Clinton impeachment trial had become "pure theater. "117 News re-
ports stated there was no real chance that the President would be
removed from office. 108 In order to convict the President of an im-
peachable offense, sixty-seven out of 100 Senators would have to
vote to convict. 109 Prior to the vote to acquit the President, forty-
four Senators had voted to dismiss the impeachable offenses
against the President. The only real issue prior to the Senate vote
on the impeachment charges was who would come out looking
.worse: the President for seducing Monica Lewinsky, a young intern,
and attempting to cover it up, or the Republicans for prolonging
the scandal. 1 ' In the days just before the Senate vote in the im-
peachment proceedings, behind the scenes, it was not about re-
moving the President, but "about dishing dirt and posturing for
history."12 In the last week of the impeachment proceedings most
Americans could only wonder why the impeachment proceedings
were still going on."3 The answer lies partly in the egos of politicalS 14
partisans. A number of conservative Republican Senators up for
re-election in the upcoming year of 2000 supported the impeach-
ment show trial in order to satisfy the Republican right-wing base
and promote Republican Party unity."5 The Clinton impeachment
proceeding pretrial negotiations in the Senate had very little to do
with Clinton's innocence or guilt." 6 The pretrial negotiations were
perceived to address the real stakes of how voters and history would
treat Clinton's accusers and defenders and the future impact of the
proceedings on American life and politics."'
In the final analysis, the Senate's failure to convict President
Clinton of any impeachable offenses made America's 210-year-old
constitutional process a real winner. " The Senate vote simply mir-
107. Id. at 22.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 24.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Cragg Hines, Process was Painful, Not Perilous, Hous. CHRON., Feb.13, 1999,
at IA.
2001] 2513
15
Weeden: The Clinton Impeachment Indicates a Presidential Impeachable Offe
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2001
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
rored the popular will of most Americans that the President's post-
juvenile sexual indiscretions and cover-up attempts with a woman
young enough to be his daughter were not a basis to remove him
from office. 9  The impeachment process was not pretty because
any contemplation by Congress of overturning the electoral will of
the people should arouse a passionate response.12  The polling
immediately after the impeachment proceedings suggests that
Americans will bring vengeance upon the Republicans for sponsor-
ing and endorsing the Clinton impeachment proceedings. The
early post-impeachment polling suggests the Republican party will.
suffer because Americans twice elected Clinton as President, in
spite of his character flaws, and were not happy with a partisan Re-
publican effort to second-guess its political judgment.
Professor Gerhardt believes that the legitimacy of a presiden-
tial impeachment turns on the judgment of history. While it may
be true that history will decide whether an impeachment is legiti-
mate, the popular political compass of the people will decide
whether the impeachment is successful. In the immediate analysis,
the critical question about a presidential impeachment is structural
implications for respecting the Democratic political compass of the
people to elect the President. It is true that presidential impeach-
ment decisions directly implicate structural separation of power is-124
sues. Under a separation of power analysis, Congress' use of the
impeachment power is limited by its perception of the popular po-
litical compass. In a presidential impeachment proceeding, the
popular political compass outside of Congress serves as an addi-
tional check to the House and Senate conduct. I believe the Fram-
ers of the Constitution intended for the influence of the press to be
an additional check on Congress' impeachment powers. 125 It was
119. Id.
120. Id. at 18A.
121. Id.
122. Id. "Rep. Henry Hyde of Illinois, Chief House Manager of the case
against Clinton, recalled Friday, how the Republican legislator-prosecutor kept
hoping the public would move from what he described as 'indifference' toward
Clinton's action toward outrage." Id.
123. Gerhardt, supra note 69, at 907.
124. Id.
125. Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 634 (1975). Accord-
ing to Justice Stewart, the authors of the Constitution intended for the press to
"create a fourth institution outside the government as an additional check to the
three official branches." Id.; Richard L. Berke &Janet Elder, Keep Clinton in Office,
2514 [Vol. 27:4
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the press that informed both America and Congress that popular. .. ... 126
opinion was against impeaching the President.
IV. CLINTON'S IMPEACHMENT LEGACY Is THE EXPANSIVE
INTERPRETATION GIVEN IMPEACHABLE OFFENSES UNDER THE
"OTHER HIGH CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS" LANGUAGE OF THE
CONSTITUTION
According to Professor Gerhardt, the drafters of the United
States Constitution did a remarkable job of separating American.... 127
impeachment law from the British in eight ways. First, in Amer-
ica, impeachment only applies to "[t]he President, Vice President
and all civil officers of the United States." 28 Second, in England,
anyone could be impeached, with the exception of royal family
members. 29 Third, the American Constitution attempted to nar-
row the scope of impeachable offenses to "treason, bribery or other• • •',130
high crimes or misdemeanors. Fourth, the British took a very
expansive view of what constituted an impeachable offense as com-
pared to the more narrowly-tailored American version of im-
Most Say in Poll, But Support is Eroding, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1998, at Al (citing New
York Times/CBS News poll conducted Aug. 17, 1998).
126. Alter, supra note 99, at 31-32.
For the traditional news media, that light at the end of the Lewinsky tun-
nel is an oncoming train. New technologies are bearing down at high
speed on the old engines of information. This scandal may be remem-
bered as the moment at which the status quo in the news business finally
crashed and burned .... The Lewinsky story also marks the journey of
rumor and innuendo to the center of the media universe. In fact, the
first word of the President's affair with the intern broke when Drudge
used his Web site to convey a rumor he heard about Newsweek's working
on the story .... [B]ut Newsweek didn't have enough confirmation to pub-
lish it yet. In that case, the purloined scoop was partly accurate. Many
other rumors-like the semen-stained dress - have also turned out to be
true .... While Clinton critics lost their struggle in the country as a whole,
they won on the Web. If "old media" were often seen as liberal, "new
media" are materializing as conservative and libertarian. The next big
political crisis might see the Internet and cable culture leading the public
opinion rather than railing against it.
Id.
127. Gerhardt, supra note 69, at 908.
128. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
129. Gerhardt, supra note 69, at 908 (citing 15 AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCY-
CLOPEDIA OF LAW 1061, 1064 (David S. Garland & Lucius P. McGehee eds., 1900)
[hereinafter AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAw].
130. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
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peachment13' Fifth, in England, the House of Lords only needed a
majority to convict.3 2 Sixth, in America, the impeachment trial is
conducted in the Senate and "no person shall be convicted without
the concurrence of two-thirds of the members present.•133 Seventh,
under the British system, the House of Lords had total discretion
on punishment upon conviction. Eighth, in the United States,
the impeachment punishment is limited to "removal from office,
and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office or honor, trust or
profit under the United States .... The King had the ability toi u. 
136
pardon an impeachment conviction, but the American Constitu-
tion prohibits the President from granting an impeachment convic-
tion pardon.1 7 The United States Constitution provides that the
President may be impeached,38 but the King in England is not sub-
ject to the impeachment process. The English treated impeach-
ment proceedings as criminal proceedings while the American
Constitution distinguishes between impeachment proceedings and
criminal proceedings. In Britain, there were many methods to
impeach judges, but under the Constitution, impeachment is the
only process available for presidential removal. I believe the
words "high crimes or misdemeanors," for purposes of presidential
impeachment, mean whatever the requisite majority in Congress
want them to mean. Professor Gerhardt cautions that these terms
must be considered in their historical, constitutional context.
42
131. AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW, supra note 129, at 1066.
132. Id. at 1071.
133. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
134. AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW, supra note 129, at 1072.
135. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
136. AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW, supra note 129, at 1072.
137. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
138. Id. § 4.
139. AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAw, supra note 129, at 1062.
140. Gerhardt, supra note 2, at 23.
141. See generally MICHAELJ. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A
CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 82-102 (1996).
142. Gerhardt, supra note 69, at 909.
Of these distinctive features, the one of greatest contemporary concern is
the founders' choice of the words-"treason, bribery, and other high
crimes or misdemeanors"-for delineating and narrowing the scope of
the federal impeachment process. The founders did not discuss the
meaning of "other high crimes or misdemeanors" extensively, certainly
not in any way that definitively resolves the precise meanings of those
terms. Nevertheless, the context and content of the founders' principal
discussions about the phrase "other high crimes or misdemeanors" pro-
2516 [Vol. 27:4
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Professor Gerhardt takes the position that the founders of the
Constitution intentionally made a decision to loosely define the
terms "other high crimes and misdemeanors" for purposes of im-
peachable offenses.' 43  The founders discussed the terms "high
crimes and misdemeanors" extensively, and most likely anticipated
the cases that would arise in impeachment proceedings. By
agreeing to make other high crimes or misdemeanors the basis for
an impeachable offense, the founders chose terms of art to de-
scribe offenses that would actually develop their substantive con-
tent in the future on a case-by-case basis.1
4 5
Most commentators examining the constitutional terms of art
"other high crimes or misdemeanors" have concluded that these
terms refer to political crimes.' 46 By allowing the terms "other high
crimes or misdemeanors" to be developed on a case by case basis,
contemporary impeachment proceedings on a de facto basis have
been granted expanded constitutional jurisdiction to define what
constitutes an impeachable offense. This expanded constitutional
common law to decide impeachable offenses on a case-by-case basis
in fact resembles the early English Parliament's unconstrained and
expansive jurisdiction to define impeachable offenses.14  This ex-
pansive power to define a substantive impeachment is in spite of
the founders' attempt not to follow the British precedent of an ex-
vide an important backdrop to contemporary efforts to understand the
meaning of the phrase.
Id.
143. Id. at 913.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 930 & nn.49-61 (citing RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL PROBLEMS 58 (1974); CHARLES L. BLACGJR., IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK 35,
39-40 (1974); GEORGE T. CURTIS, CONSTIUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
260-61 (1974); PETER HOFFER & N.E.H. HULL, IMPEACHMENT IN AMERICA 1635-1805
(1984); CHARLESE. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 19 (1928);
JOSEPH STORY, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 269-87
(1987); 1 JAMES WILSON, LECTURES ON THE LAW, No. 11, COMPARISON OF THE CON-
STITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH THAT OF GREAT BRITAIN, THE WORKS OFJAMES
WILSON 382, 408 (Robert McCloskey ed., 1987); Arthur Bestor, Impeachment, 49
WASH. L. REv. 255, 264-66 (1973) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS (1974); John Feerick, Impeaching FederalJudges: A Study
of the Constitutional Provisions, 39 FORDHAM L. REv. 1, 47-58 (1970); Paul S. Fenton,
The Scope of the Impeachment Power, 65 Nw. U. L. REv. 719, 726 (1971), Arthur J.
Goldberg, The Question of Impeachment, 1 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 5, 6 (1974)
147. AMERICAN AND ENGLISH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW, supra note 129, at 1066.
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pansive definition of an impeachable offense. 148 The delegates to
the Constitutional Convention tried to narrow the scope of the im-
peachable offenses to high crimes or misdemeanors. 4 As a practi-
cal matter, there is no real limit to the terms "high crimes or mis-
demeanors" or "political crime" in the impeachment proceedings.
An impeachable offense is only limited by rational dictates of
members of Congress driven by the popular political compass of
the people. In the absence of treason or bribery, an impeachable
offense is a term loosely defined by the contemporary political cli-
mate with a generic reference to the constitutional language of
"other high crimes or misdemeanors." 50
V. CONGRESS' POLITICAL COMPASS AS DRIVEN BY SELF-INTEREST
DETERMINES THE FATE OF AN IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDING
From a historical perspective, the basis for an impeachable of-
fense consisted of an injury to the State.' 5' On the present Ameri-
can political scene, an impeachable offense which only injures the
State and does not do great harm to the American political com-
pass may be sufficient to constitute an impeachable offense, but it is
clearly unlikely to serve as a basis for a conviction on the offense.
152
On January 5, 1999, two weeks after the House impeached Presi-
dent Clinton, Republican Senator Strom Thurmond of South Caro-
lina said it takes two-thirds votes to convict the President of an im-
peachable offense, "We don't have it. Let's get it over."'53 After the
Lewinsky scandal broke, President Clinton chose to go to war
rather than sue for peace in his battle against those who wanted to
remove him from office. 54 The President's political and legal advi-
sors cleverly demonized prosecutor Ken Starr while playing to pub-
lic opinion with successful arguments that this investigation and
subsequent impeachment proceeding "was about sex, not constitu-
tional substance." 5 In the end, the President was spared an im-
148. Gerhardt, supra note 69, at 908.
149. Id.
150. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
151. Bestor, supra note 146, at 264.
152. Evan Thomas, Why Clinton Won: What Saved the President at Trial? An In-
triguing Mix of Polls, Senatorial Pride and, as Usual, the Excesses of His Enemies. The In-
side Story of Clinton's Acquittal, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 22, 1999, at 24.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 25-26.
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peachment conviction because of senatorial high-mindedness and
back-room dealing. 56 Many senators thought that the impeach-
ment vote in the House was a spectacle not to be repeated. The
senators had read the polls and were not interested in reviewing
Clinton's sex life in order to convict him of impeachable of-
fenses.""
In escaping an impeachment conviction, Clinton had once
again outlasted his political enemies.5 9 President Clinton realized
that the political impeachment proceedings were a game of com-
parison. Compared "to Ken Starr, Linda Tripp and the [Repub-
lican] House managers, [the President] was, by far, [a] lesser evil in
the eyes of most Americans., 16' At the end of the impeachment
proceedings, the President had an approval rating of sixty-six per-
cent, according to a Newsweek poll. 16r President Clinton was not
convicted of an impeachable offense because the political compass,
driven by polls provided for by our constitutional structure, in-
formed leaders of the Senate that its political self-interest and pride
would be served by not removing President Clinton from office.
163
Two weeks after the House impeached President Clinton, four Re-
publican Senators and four Democratic Senators met privately in
Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott's office.'6 The purpose of the
meeting with Lott was to lay careful groundwork that would pro-
mote the dignity of the Senate in the impeachment proceedings
and virtually assure that Clinton would not be convicted. 65
156. Id. at 26.
For some years now, Senate old-timers have been quietly muttering about
a loss of civility and collegiality in their chamber. They blamed TV cam-
eras and an influx of bomb throwers from the House. To the traditional-
ists, the impeachment vote in the House was a spectacle not to be re-
peated. The dignity of the upper house was at stake. The senators had
read the polls and weren't interested in rummaging through Clinton's
sex life. The best strategy: preserve institutional pride and get it over with
fast.
Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Howard Fineman, The Survivor, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 22, 1999, at 20, 23.
160. Id. at 23.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Thomas, supra note 152, at 25.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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After the meeting with Lott, the Senate took its first vote of the
impeachment proceeding.' 66 The Senate voted 100 to zero to
adopt procedural rules for the trial.6 7 The day before the ground-
rule vote, Lott announced he would visit the House Managers.168
"Lott was already suspect to the House Managers-a little too slick,
too willing to make deals.' 6 9 At that meeting, Lott told the House
Managers that the Senate would never permit a normal trial be-
cause of the Democrats.17 The meeting with Lott made three Re-
publican House Managers, Chris Cannon, Lindsey Graham and Jim
Rogan angry enough to threaten not to participate in the im-S 171
peachment trial. 7 I won't participate in any sham trial," Rogan
said.
172
The Senate took a vote on the number of witnesses to partici-
173pate at the trial. The House managers would have to make their
case against the President before the Senate with the videotaped
depositions of three witnesses and not a single live witness.1 74 The
key vote on witnesses was taken along partisan party lines and the
"talking heads immediately proclaimed partisan warfare." 75 The
witness vote did not represent partisan warfare but an alliance of
bipartisan convenience because of the behind-the-scenes, joint ef-
fort of Lott and Daschle.176 Both Lott and Daschle were committed
to a "short, dignified, impeachment trial."177 For Daschle, the vote
to limit witnesses represented a short trial and an opportunity to
save his fellow Democrat, President Clinton, from being the first
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 30.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
Daschle and Lott were forging an alliance of convenience. Lott and
Daschle are opposites: Lott is a former Ole Miss cheerleader, Daschle
cerebral and introverted. Neither man really likes the other. They had
squabbled so openly last year that Democrat Patrick Leahy of Vermont
had pleaded with both men to make peace for the sake of the institution.
Id.
177. Id.
2520 [Vol. 27:4
22
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 4 [2001], Art. 7
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol27/iss4/7
IMPEACHABLE OFFENSE LIMITATIONS
president to ever be convicted of an impeachable offense.7 8 The
vote on witnesses and short impeachment trial presented Lott with
an opportunity to rescue the Republican Party from deeper disaster
brought on by the unpopular Clinton impeachment proceedings.'
Clinton avoided conviction in the impeachment proceedings be-
cause the political self-interest of the Senate, as an institution,
deemed it necessary and proper to acquit him on charges of lying
to cover up a series of sex scandals. The Senate followed the politi-
cal compass that said the public was very forgiving of a married
man with a family lying to cover up his sexual misconduct, even if
that man happens to be the President of the United States.
The popular law of impeachment is more conclusive than con-
stitutional law on whether impeachment proceedings are war-
ranted."0 "By popular law ... [Professor Pious] mean[s] the re-
sponses given by the American people in public opinion surveys
involving the grounds on which impeachment proceedings areg.,,1s1
warranted. I believe the law of presidential impeachment is ac-
tually the political compass that compels Congress not to remove
an elected President from office if there is any rational basis to be-
lieve that the President enjoys substantial support from the public
and his or her political party. The political compass of members of
Congress places a great deal of emphasis in projected self-interest
electoral outcomes in trying to decide whether impeachment pro-
ceedings should be instituted against the President. Professor Pi-
ous asserts the popular law of impeachment values electoral out-
comes over narrow legalism, with a potentially higher standard for
an impeachable offense than the indictable offense standard. 
ls
178. Id.
179. Id.
Lott has to tread carefully with the twenty-odd right-wing senators who
kept talking about the party's "base"-the conservative true believers who
turn out at election time. The "base," these senators argued, wanted to
see a full-scale trial. Lott smiled and listened to the right-wingers, but he
quietly did business with Daschle. He gave the Democratic leader a veto
over calling more witnesses or expanding the scope of the trial.
Id.
180. Pious, supra note 32, at 892.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 893.
The popular law values electoral outcomes over narrow legalisms, thus
raising the impeachment bar much higher than the "indictable crime"
standard. Consider the structure of public opinion in the early months
of the Watergate scandal: a poll taken in a major Midwestern metropoli-
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The popular law of impeachment theory is actually a political com-
pass driven by opinion polls, which may either raise the bar or
lower the bar for an impeachable offense because the political
compass is guided by the political self-interest of Congress. In the
tan area in September 1973 indicated that a majority of respondents be-
lieved Nixon was involved in Watergate crimes, but a majority did not
want Nixon to resign or the House to impeach him. One-third of the re-
spondents thought Nixon was guilty but didn't want to see him leave of-
fice. At the time of this survey, Nixon's Gallup Poll approval ratings were
in the thirty-five percent range, soon to move to twenty-seven percent, in-
flation and unemployment were high, and the market was in the dol-
drums. The key factor was the desire of voters to continue the man they
had voted for in office: a vote for Nixon in 1972 correlated closely with a
desire not to see him resign or be removed from office, in spite of low
approval ratings. It takes a lot more than a scandal, a poor economy, or
an allegation of a criminal offense to get a majority of the electorate to
abandon an elected president. Although steadily rising, support for
Nixon's removal or resignation did not go over the fifty percent mark in
national surveys until January 1974, after the Saturday Night Massacre,
and after Vice President Agnew had resigned from office. By the time of
Nixon's resignation, almost one-fourth of the electorate still did not
think that he should leave office or be removed from it.
Id. at 893-94 (citations omitted).
183. Thomas & Hosenball, supra note 104, at 22.
Behind the scenes, it's not about removing the President anymore. It's
about saving face, dishing dirt and posturing for history .... The sham
quality to the endgame was exposed by the Senate's failure to call Betty
Currie as a witness. In any court of law, Currie's testimony would be cru-
cial to making a case against Clinton of obstruction ofjustice. Currie's
statements to the FBI and her grand-jury testimony suggest that the
President coached his secretary to lie about his relationship with Monica
Lewinsky. But in her several appearances before the grand jury, Currie
was all over the map, failing to remember events that she once easily re-
called. The Republican managers argued, unconvincingly, that Currie's
testimony had been clear enough. But the real reason she was not able
to re-enact what some GOP senators call "The Scene .... " A majority of
the Republican senators are fairly hard-line conservatives. Led by Don
Nickles of Oklahoma and Phil Gramm of Texas, they have been pressing
for a full trial in the Senate, witnesses and all. They argue that the base-
the right-wing true believers who reliably turn out to vote on Election
Day-want to see Clinton disgraced, even if he can't be thrown out. The
more testimony about the President's moral failings, the better. Republi-
can moderates, however, worry about a backlash that the GOP will be
forever identified as the scandal-obsessed Impeachment Party. Lott is
somewhere in between: a conservative, but also a deal-maker. His deli-
cate maneuvering was revealed by the Senate's vote last week on wit-
nesses. On the surface, it appeared that the GOP had simply rolled over
the Democrats. The TV commentators immediately proclaimed a fierce
partisan clash. So why, then were Lott and Minority Leader Tom Daschle
smiling and joking on the Senate floor? Because, on close inspection,
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House, a majority of Congressmen, led by the Republicans, read
the political compass as indicating that the President had commit-
ted an impeachable offense. The impeachment political compass
directing the House of Representatives lost its way in the Senate. In
the Senate trial, the political compass of self-interest failed to de-
liver a simple majority vote to convict the President.1s4 During the
course of the trial, many Republican senators began to realize that
the unpopular impeachment proceedings gave the Democrats a po-
litical advantage.' A Newsweek poll, shortly before the impeach-
ment vote in the Senate, indicated that even Republicans believed
that they were taking a negative hit for leading the impeachmentn . 186
proceedings against the President.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is almost impossible to understand how President Clinton
could gain in approval ratings at a time when a majority of Ameri-
cans believe that the President has personal character flaws on is-
sues of sex and morality.1s7 I believe the President's approval rat-
ings went up because the public believed the President's bad
behavior was less objectionable than that of a handful of deter-
mined enemies of the President.]88 These enemies included a net-
the rules were rigged to keep the trial from getting out of control. The
vote to call witnesses gave Lott credibility with his right flank. At the
same time, Daschle was given an absolute veto on calling any new prose-
cution witnesses. The center held, at least for the time being.
Id. at 22-25.
184. Thomas, supra note 152, at 26.
With five Republicans (all Northeastern moderates) voting to acquit, the
Democrats had a shot at blocking even a simple majority to convict on
both perjury and obstruction of justice. Byrd was the swing vote .... Not
until a few minutes before the vote did anxious White House lawyers
learn Byrd's intentions. He would vote to acquit.
Id. at 31.
185. Alter, supra note 99, at 31.
186. Id.
187. Pious, supra note 32, at 902.
188. Michael Isikoff, The Right Wing Web, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 22, 1999, at 32.
Busy elves. Who were these lawyers? What were they doing? It would take
me eighteen months to piece together and confirm the important role
they played in the Lewinsky affair. As I reported on the story in 1997 and
into 1998, 1 got hints that some conservative lawyers were working behind
the scenes. And Newsweek did report the outlines of their activity as early
as the first weeks of the scandal .... Although the conspirators were con-
servative, they were not the "vast" group that Hillary Clinton suspected
2001] 2523
25
Weeden: The Clinton Impeachment Indicates a Presidential Impeachable Offe
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2001
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
work of conservative lawyers called "busy elves" that assisted Paula
Jones in her sexual harassment suit as well as helped Linda Tripp
tell Kenneth Starr about Monica Lewinsky's sexual relationship
with the President.8 9 At the impeachment trial, fifty percent of the
Senate followed the self-interest political compass directive by ac-
commodating American public sentiment that the President's
enemies and distracters acted in bad faith by not respecting the
Presidenc as an institution and violating Clinton's sexual privacy as
a person. The American public wants the prosecutor and the
media to respect a zone of privacy for the President. Clinton sur-
vived the impeachment process because of a public perception that
his presidency received unfair treatment by bitter partisans both in
and out of Congress. 9 The Senate read the political compass tea
.... The story begins in Little Rock with a lawyer named Cliff Jackson.
One of Clinton's bitter foes, Jackson had been unearthing secrets of Clin-
ton's for years. In 1994, the work paid off. He persuaded journalist Bill
Rempel of the Los Angles Times and David Brock of the American Spec-
tator to investigate allegations that Clinton, while Governor, had used
state troopers to procure women. When PaulaJones recognized herself
as one of the women in Brock's piece, she wanted to file suit against the
President-to regain her good name, she said. Jackson was eager to get
her the best attorneys. Gerry Spence wasn't interested. Neither was Anita
Hill. The National Organization for Women responded with a form let-
ter and a kit on how to file a lawsuit .... No incumbent president had ever
been sued for things he'd done before taking office. Was the case consti-
tutional? It was up to the Supreme Court to decide. Readying their ar-
gument for the high court, Jones' lawyers were befriended by none other
than Kenneth Starr, then in private practice. The former appellate judge
believed the case had merit and counseled them to move forward. Starr
and Davis spoke a half-dozen times for a total of four-and-a-half hours in
June 1994, discussing ways the Jones attorneys could undercut the Presi-
dent's claims of immunity. Starr's help ended there. In August 1994 he
was named independent counsel and cut off contact with Davis. By then,
however, elves had enlisted the help of another conservative lawyer - a
brilliant young litigator named George Conway.
Id. at 32-33.
189. Id.
190. L. Darnell Weeden, Protecting the President's Limited Expectation of Privacy
During an Investigation May Justify the Protective Function Privilege for the Secret Service,
60 MoNr. L. REv. 109, 138 (1999). "The common law justification for a privacy
based protective function privilege is supported by the tradition of Warren and
Brandeis, that all individuals including the President shall benefit from a privacy
principle as old as the common law." Id.
191. Pious, supra note 32, at 902.
192. L. Darnell Weeden, The President and Mrs. Jones Were in Federal Court: The
Litigation Established No Constitutional Immunity for President Clinton, 7 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 361, 378 (1999).
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leaves and concluded that the President's inappropriate sexual be-
havior did not merit conviction and removal from office. Professor
Pious feared that if the Republican-led impeachment proceedings
produced an impeachable offense on the basis of partisan opinion,
as opposed to popular opinion, such a result could lead to a consti-
tutional crisis and a political backlash. 93 The constitutional struc-
ture of the electoral Democratic political compass creates enough
inherent self-interest tension among voters, the legislative, execu-
tive and the judicial branch to ensure that it is almost impossible to
remove a President from office under constitutional procedure
without substantial majority support. A constitutional crisis was
avoided simply because the political compass inherent in our con-
stitutional structure indicated to the Senate that Congress would
suffer a serious political backlash if the President, elected by the
people, was removed from office. Throughout the Clinton im-
peachment proceedings, the American Constitution and its com-
mon law tradition for establishing an impeachable offense served
the American people well.
[O]n a functional level, courts should be able to grant a sitting president
temporary immunity from sensationalized private litigation, which nega-
tively impacts the Office of the President. The saga involving President
Clinton and PaulaJones demonstrates that the government can continue
to function while the President is unduly distracted by private litigation.
But respect for the Presidency, as an institution under Article II, is se-
verely undermined by private litigation against a sitting president.
Id.
193. Pious, supra note 32, at 904.
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